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China’s Rapidly Evolving Health Care System
easier to reform health insurance 
than delivery systems and that in 
creating effective delivery systems, 
primary care seems to play a vi-
tal role.
A review of China’s health care 
journey reveals that its leadership 
has made significant errors but 
has also acted with flexibility 
and decisiveness in correcting its 
mistakes. China’s willingness to 
undertake major health care ex-
periments will make its system 
an interesting one to continue to 
observe in the future.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this article 
at NEJM.org.
From the Commonwealth Fund, New York 
(D.B.); and the Department of Health Policy 
and Management, Harvard T.H. Chan 
School of Public Health, Boston (W.H.).
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MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION
A 55-year-old man with no serious health conditions has a moder-
ately severe myocardial infarction.
Management of myocardial infarction in China varies consid-
erably between rural and urban areas, and Mr. Li lives in a rural 
area, where he’s covered by rural health insurance. He develops 
chest pain around midday. An hour later, he calls the village doc-
tor, who arrives at his home about 30 minutes later and adminis-
ters nitroglycerin tablets. When the pain is not alleviated, the 
doctor calls a senior internist at the county hospital, who advises 
the patient to call an ambulance to transport him to the hospital, 
which is 30 minutes away. As is customary in China, however, Mr. 
Li waits for his daughter to come home from work so she can 
accompany him. He arrives at the hospital around 7 p.m.
There, electrocardiography and myocardial-enzyme tests con-
firm that he’s having a myocardial infarction. He has two treatment 
options: intravenous thrombolysis at the county hospital or cardiac 
catheterization at a tertiary care hospital. His doctor recommends 
the latter, since it’s too late for thrombolysis to be effective.
Mr. Li hesitates because of the added expense of care at the 
tertiary facility: treatment at the county hospital requires a $300-
to-$600 copayment, as compared with $2,000 to $2,500 at the 
tertiary facility. His family’s annual income is only $6,000. Never-
theless, he opts for the tertiary hospital.
Mr. Li undergoes angiography and receives two stents. He 
stays in the hospital for 2 weeks, spending half that time in the 
cardiac intensive care unit. He is discharged on aspirin, clopido-
grel, an angiotensin-converting–enzyme inhibitor, a beta-blocker, 
spironolactone, and a statin. His insurance pays 60% of the cost 
of these medicines up to a maximum of $800, leaving him with 
out-of-pocket medication expenses of $700 to $800 per year.
Mr. Li receives very little counseling about preventive mea-
sures such as smoking cessation or hypertension or lipid man-
agement. He returns to his village with no arrangements for pri-
mary care follow-up.
Informed Consent and the First Amendment
Wendy K. Mariner, J.D., M.P.H., and George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
For more than two decades, states have been adding to 
the things that physicians must 
say and do to obtain “informed 
consent” — and thereby testing 
the constitutional limits of states’ 
power to regulate medical prac-
tice. In 1992, the Supreme Court 
upheld states’ authority to require 
physicians to provide truthful 
information that might encour-
age a woman to reconsider her 
decision to have an abortion, 
finding that such a requirement 
did not place an “undue burden” 
on the woman.1
Now, there is a potential vehi-
cle for a new Supreme Court ex-
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amination of informed consent: 
a recent decision by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit that conflicts with other 
appellate court decisions. The 
Fourth Circuit struck down a 
North Carolina statute, called the 
Display of Real-Time View Re-
quirement, that required physi-
cians to “perform an obstetric 
real-time view of the unborn 
child” that the patient could see; 
to simultaneously explain the dis-
play, including “the presence, lo-
cation, and dimensions of the 
unborn child within the uterus 
and the number of unborn chil-
dren depicted,” as well as “the 
presence of external members 
and internal organs, if present 
and viewable”; and to offer the 
patient “the opportunity to hear 
the fetal heart tone.” The woman 
undergoing ultrasonography, pre-
sumably partially unclothed, was 
permitted to avert her eyes and 
cover her ears, but the physician 
was required to speak. Penalties 
for noncompliance included lia-
bility for damages and disciplin-
ary measures, including license 
revocation, by the North Caroli-
na Medical Board. The appeals 
court concluded that the statute 
violated the First Amendment’s 
prohibition on state-compelled 
speech.2
The First Amendment protects 
both the freedom to speak and 
the freedom not to speak. How-
ever, there are limits to both 
freedoms. As long as the law is 
viewpoint-neutral, the state can 
limit the time, place, and man-
ner of speech for legitimate pur-
poses. For example, government 
can limit loud rallies to daytime 
hours and require that they take 
place away from hospitals, but it 
cannot constitutionally allow only 
the Democratic Party and not the 
Republican Party to hold rallies.
The state can regulate the 
content of advertising (“commer-
cial speech”) to protect consum-
ers from “commercial harms,” 
such as false or misleading state-
ments or claims, as long as the 
regulation is viewpoint-neutral. 
It can also require private entities 
to inform consumers of objec-
tive, accurate facts that may not 
be common knowledge, such as 
the ingredients in processed food, 
the true rate of interest on a 
mortgage, or the actual cost of 
attorneys’ legal services.3 But the 
state cannot entirely prohibit ad-
vertising of a legal product such 
as contraceptives or tobacco sim-
ply because it wants to discour-
age their sales.
Medical services are analo-
gous to commercial practices for 
purposes of the First Amendment. 
The government has an interest 
in regulating medical practice to 
ensure safe and effective care. It 
also has an interest in ensuring 
that patients have enough accu-
rate information to make volun-
tary, informed treatment decisions. 
Hence, it is the physician’s duty 
under the doctrine of informed 
consent to provide material in-
formation about the benefits and 
risks of both the recommended 
treatment and its alternatives. 
However, the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from 
compelling people to make false 
or misleading statements or to 
express the government’s point 
of view as their own.
Relying on the 1992 Supreme 
Court decision, North Carolina 
contended that the required fetal 
sonogram descriptions are mere-
ly statements of fact. The Fourth 
Circuit, however, found that 
North Carolina’s display provi-
sion represented “quintessential 
compelled speech,” calling the 
required description “ideological; 
it conveys a particular opinion.”2 
The court, finding that the 
“state’s avowed intent and the 
anticipated effect” were to dis-
courage abortion, said that the 
provision compelled physicians 
to serve as a mouthpiece for the 
state’s point of view.2
North Carolina also argued 
that it was not compelling speech, 
but simply regulating conduct — 
the practice of medicine — and 
that the law could therefore be 
justified under a more lenient 
standard of review. It cited a de-
cision by the Fifth Circuit find-
ing that similar, but somewhat 
less specific, information was 
truthful, nonmisleading, and rel-
evant to abortion decisions and 
did not impose any particular 
viewpoint.4
The Fourth Circuit was unper-
suaded. “Though the information 
conveyed may be strictly factual,” 
it said, “the context surrounding 
the delivery of it promotes the 
viewpoint the state wishes to en-
courage.”2 The court emphasized 
that the context in which words 
are spoken can convert facts into 
propaganda. In this case, a 
woman in a vulnerable position 
lying partially disrobed on an ex-
amination table, who relies on 
her physician for objective medi-
cal information, must either lis-
ten to and watch the state’s mes-
sage or cover her eyes and ears. 
In such circumstances, the court 
concluded, “the state has . . . 
moved from ‘encouraging’ to lec-
turing, using health care provid-
ers as its mouthpiece.”2
Do laws like the North Caro-
lina statute improve the informed-
consent process — or distort it 
by commandeering physicians to 
act as agents of the state? The 
answer will affect not only abor-
tion services but all medical 
practice. As the Supreme Court 
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has made clear, “a requirement 
that a doctor give a woman cer-
tain information as part of ob-
taining her consent to an abortion 
is, for constitutional purposes, 
no different from a requirement 
that a doctor give certain specific 
information about any medical 
procedure.”1 If the state can re-
quire physicians to perform spe-
cific procedures and tell patients 
certain things about abortion, it 
can do the same for kidney trans-
plantation, contraceptives, psychi-
atric treatment, and investiga-
tional therapies.
Last July, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit upheld a 
Florida law forbid-
ding physicians to 
ask patients about 
firearms in the 
home, finding that the prohibi-
tion did not violate physicians’ 
First Amendment rights when 
the inquiry is “unnecessary to a 
patient’s care.”5 The court did, 
however, note a fundamental rea-
son for the doctrine of informed 
consent: “when a patient enters a 
physician’s examination room, the 
patient is in a position of relative 
powerlessness.”5 The Fourth Cir-
cuit recognized this vulnerability, 
too, but drew a different conclu-
sion. Instead of protecting pa-
tient autonomy, North Carolina’s 
law forced the patient to take af-
firmative steps to protect herself 
against unwelcome, distressing, 
or unhelpful speech from the very 
physician she relies on for per-
sonalized care. This charade de-
means both the physician and 
the patient.
These cases present two radi-
cally different views of informed 
consent: the traditional view that 
rational decision making and pa-
tient autonomy are best protected 
by allowing physicians to tailor 
disclosures to their patients’ needs 
and preferences; and the view 
that government can use informed 
consent to encourage specific de-
cisions by regulating what tests 
physicians must perform, what 
information they must present, 
and what information they can-
not seek.
Laws prescribing exactly what 
physicians must say, regardless 
of patients’ needs or preferences, 
make a mockery of informed 
consent and patient autonomy. 
Laws that compel physicians to 
speak for the state devalue physi-
cians’ professional judgment and 
responsibility to act in patients’ 
best interests. The First Amend-
ment was adopted to keep the 
government from controlling what 
people, including physicians, say. 
Protection of patients’ rights 
should not be used as a pretext 
to promote partisan political pur-
poses in the examining room.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this article 
at NEJM.org.
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Market-Based Solutions to Antitrust Threats — The Rejection 
of the Partners Settlement
Regina E. Herzlinger, D.B.A., Barak D. Richman, J.D., Ph.D., and Kevin A. Schulman, M.D.
Health care consumers won a significant victory when 
Massachusetts Suffolk County 
Superior Court Judge Janet Sanders 
blocked a settlement that would 
have allowed Partners Health-
Care, the system that dominates 
the Boston area, to acquire three 
additional health care providers 
in eastern Massachusetts. San-
ders concluded that the acquisi-
tions “would cement Partners’ 
already strong position in the 
health care market and give it 
the ability, because of this mar-
ket muscle, to exact higher pric-
es from insurers for the services 
its providers render.”
If this decision is not over-
turned on appeal, consumers 
will now be spared those project-
ed price increases. But there is an 
even bigger reason for New En-
glanders to celebrate the judge’s 
ruling. The danger lay not only 
in Partners’ expanded dominance 
but also in the degree to which 
the settlement would have shut 
out other innovative competitors.
Sanders’s ruling closes the lat-
est chapter in the saga of Part-
ners HealthCare, a system formed 
in 1994 as a merger between the 
world-famous Massachusetts Gen-
eral and Brigham and Women’s 
Hospitals. Beginning in 2010, then 
Massachusetts Attorney General 
Martha Coakley presciently warned 
of Partners’ growing pricing 
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